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Oraka Technologies Ltd v Geostel Vision Ltd
HO, Hamilton CIV 2005-419-809, 18 February 2009, AllanJ
This was a copyright case about asparagus grading equip
ment.
The third plaintiff, Mr Schwartz, developed the "Oraka
grader" for grading asparagus spears. The Oraka grader
involved a cup assembly used to transport and grade indi
vidual asparagus spears, and collection chutes designed to
collect the spears when a cup assembly is electronically
triggered. The cup assembly and the chute were the subject of
this litigation. The first and second plaintiffs were companies
in which Mr Schwarz had a significant shareholding and
which played a role both in the development of the Oraka
grade; and its sale to operators in New Zealand and over
seas.
The second defendants, Messrs Paul Daynes and Gordon
Robertson, were shareholders in the first defendant, Geostel
Vision Ltd Geostel. Mr Daynes was formerly associated
with Mr Schwarz, but he subsequently incorporated Geostel
with Mr Robertson, and engaged in competition with the
plaintiffs both in respect of the sale of new graders, and in
respect of the provision of replacement parts for the plain
tiffs' grader. The third defendant was an engineering com
pany that undertook for Mr Schwarz design, tooling and
manufacturing work in respect of the cup assembly, but not
the collection chute.
The plaintiffs sued all defendants for infringement of




The plaintiffs claimed copyright in artistic works produced
in the course of the development of the Oraka cup assembly,
and which disclosed a number of specified design features.
These works were drawings and sketches, a prototype and a
mould. Some of the drawings were claimed to have been
created by the third defendant on commission by the first or
third plaintiff. This commission was claimed to be "express
or implied" and entered into in or about 1993 by an agree
ment in terms of which the third defendant agreed to design
and produce a tool for the manufacture of the Oraka cup
assembly in accordance with certain design parameters pro
vided by the first or third plaintiff. The claimed agreement
imposed on the first or third plaintiff an implied obligation to
pay the third defendant for the creation of the drawings, and
that prior to the creation of the drawings the third defendant
represented to Mr Schwarz or to the first plaintiff that the
plaintiffs would own copyright in the tooling. The plaintiffs
claimed that the implication that the drawings were pro
duced pursuant to a commission was reasonable and equi
table, obvious and necessary to give business efficacy to the
agreement, including providing the first or third plaintiff
with the right to take action against third parties for copy
right infringement.
The plaintiffs alleged that the first and third defendants
each infringed their copyright. They alleged that the first
defendant manufactured and sold a cup assembly and chute
that were substantial copies of the plaintiffs' copyright works,
and that in doing so substantially reproduced the design
features of the Oraka cup assembly and chute. They alleged
that the third defendant infringed copyright in the cup assem
bly only, by manufacturing infringing works both for the first
defendant and on its own account. The defendants did not
accept that the plaintiffs owned the copyright in the cup
assembly or the collecting chute, and denied infringement.
The Judge first considered ownership of copyright. Because
the works came into existence in 1993 or 1994, ownership
was to be determined in accordance with the Copyright
Act 1962, particularly s 9. The Judge said that the effect of
s 93 was that a person who commissioned a copyright work
in the manner described by the sub-section became, in effect,
the author of that work and entitled to take action for
infringement, and that there was no material distinction for
the purposes of this case between s 93 and s 213 of the
Copyright Act 1994. The Judge quoted the Court of Appeal
on the concept of commissioning in Pacific Software Tech
nology Ltd v Perry Group Ltd,' and referred to Plix Products
Ltd v Frank M Winstone Merchants Ltd.2 The Judge said
that it was unnecessary that commissioning be the subject of
a written agreement, or any express agreement at all. Com
missioning could be inferred in all the circumstances of the
case, but a commissioning, express or implied, must involve
an agreement to pay. The agreement must be a true consensus
and not a mere unexpressed intention to pay or a unilateral
expectation that there would be a payment.
The Judge said that neither Mr Schwarz's sketches nor the
prototype were before the Court, and there was no secondary
evidence of their appearance. While that was not necessarily
fatal, an assessment of originality in artistic works claimed to
be copyright works required either a visual inspection of
those works, or secondary evidence of their appearance. The
Court had no evidence of the precise form of the sketches,
either by description or by comparison with a model. The
1. Pacific Software Technology Ltd v Perry Group Ltd [2004] 1 NZLR 164 at [55].
2. Plix Products Ltd v Frank M Winstone Merchants Ltd 1984 3 IPR 390, 411-422.
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form of the prototype also could not be determined. While it
was not in dispute that Mr Schwarz approached the third
defendant with an idea for a cup assembly, and that the
sketches and prototype constituted certain expressions of
that idea, the precise expression to be found in the missing
works could not be determined. The Court was accordingly
unable to conclude that copyright existed in the missing
works. It was likely that Mr Schwarz expended sufficient
skill and effort for copyright to subsist, but the Court could
not compare his work with the articles alleged to infringe
copyright in the missing sketches and prototype. The sketches
and prototype could not therefore found a claim for infringe
ment.
The Judge then considered the commissioning of the cup
assembly drawings prepared for Mr Schwartz by the third
defendant. The Judge reviewed the evidence in detail, and
said that he was satisfied that the third defendant did not
charge the plaintiffs for the concept and design drawings and
that no payment was made for those drawings. There was no
evidence of an express agreement whereby the plaintiffs
would pay for the drawings, and neither was there anything
which might constitute a consensus as to payment. The third
defendant simply accepted a request to prepare some draw
ings for consideration by Mr Schwarz, and did so. There was
no mention of payment at the time, no subsequent request for
payment, and no offer of it. The third defendant offered a
free design service as a means of attracting business.
The Judge considered and rejected the argument that
commissioning must be implied because of the need for
business efficacy. The business efficacy test3 required that the
term to be implied must be reasonable and necessary in order
to make an agreement work. No such term was required in
the present case. The plaintiffs paid for tooling and for
subsequent production, and the plaintiffs had the exclusive
right to possess and use the tool for its lifetime, and were
licensed to utilise the underlying intellectual property for that
period. In addition, the Judge found that to imply a term here
would be to subvert the statutory requirements of s 93 of
the Copyright Act 1962, which set out the requirements for a
valid commissioning. Those requirements were not met, and
implication of the term sought by the plaintiffs would in
effect confer upon them copyright entitlements not authorised
by the Act.
The plaintiffs also argued that there was a trade custom by
which the commissioning of designs is implied where a
customer subsequently commissions the tooling, and the
customer then owns the copyright. The Judge also rejected
this argument. He referred to the factors required for the
implication of a term by normal trade custom4 and con
cluded that the evidence was insufficient to show that the
term contended for constituted a notorious trade practice
which goes without saying.5 The term contended for was also
not certain, and it was inconsistent with the express require
ments of s 93 of the Copyright Act 1962, reaffirmed in
s 213 of the Copyright Act 1994. The Judge therefore
rejected the argument that there existed a trade custom to
which the Court ought to have regard despite the clear
language of s 93, and said that ownership of the copyright
in the concept and design drawings rested with the third
defendant. There was no agreement for payment in respect of
those drawings, and payment was not sought because the
third defendant offered a free design service. Payments made
at a later time in respect of tooling and manufacture were
irrelevant. The Judge said that, as a matter of policy, the
Parliament had applied the long standing prima facie rule
that an author is the first owner of copyright unless contrary
arrangements are made. Where there is no commissioning
that falls within the statute and no express agreement as to
ownership of copyright, the author of a work is its owner. It
was for the plaintiffs to establish ownership of copyright in
the concept and design drawings, and they had failed to do
so.
The Judge then considered the remaining drawings and
the mould, and held that they simply copied or adapted the
concept and design drawings and in effect were no more than
a mirror image of those drawings. They were therefore of
insufficient originality to qualify for separate copyright pro
tection. The other claimed documents came into existence
after the Geostel components were designed, and so could
not found an argument for infringement in their own right.
The plaintiffs' copyright claim in respect of the cup assem
blies failed.
The chutes
Geostel, the first defendant, accepted that between 2001 and
2003 it acquired and utilised the same chutes as were at times
manufactured for the plaintiffs, and that if the plaintiffs had
copyright in the Ziebe version two chute, then Geostel was in
breach of that copyright.
The plaintiffs pleaded copyright in drawings, a prototype
chute and a sketch. After consideration, the Judge found that
the prototype was sufficiently original to attract copyright
protection. Mr Schwarz gave photographs of his prototype
to a Mr Ziebe and asked him to make chutes to the design.
Mr Ziebe said that Mr Schwarz supplied photographs and
rough sketches which illustrated his ideas, but that the whole
of the design work, including specifications and details, fell
to Mr Ziebe. Mr Ziebe claimed copyright in the Ziebe
version one and two chutes, and said they were not commis
sioned because there was no agreement for payment.
The Judge held that the Ziebe chutes were materially
different from Mr Schwarz's prototype, and that the Ziebe
chutes qualified for separate copyright protection. The Judge
agreed that there was no evidence of a relevant commission
ing, and said that Mr Ziebe owned the copyright in the Ziebe
chutes. As a result, the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue
Geostel for infringement.
Breach of fiduciary duty
The Judge considered the argument that, if the third defen
dant was the owner of the copyright in the designs and
tooling for the cup assembly, then it was under a fiduciary
3. BP Refinery Westernport Ltd v Shire of Hastings 1977 16 ALR 363, 376.
4. Woods v NJ Ellingham & Co Ltd [1977] 1 NZLR 218, Westpac Banking Corporation Ltd v Ancell 1993 4 NZBLC
103 CA.
S. Citing Everist v McEvedy [1996] 3 NZLR 348, 360.
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duty to hold its rights in trust for the first and third plain
tiffs.6 The Judge said that this argument was untenable and
must fail. It was founded on the proposition that it was a
breach of fiduciary duty for the third defendant to assert
correctly that it, rather than the plaintiffs, was the owner of
copyright in the drawings concerned. It could succeed only
where evidence existed of an underlying agreement between
the parties, pursuant to which the third defendant was obliged
to exercise its rights to copyright in the interests of the
plaintiffs, and not otherwise. There was no evidence of any
such agreement.
Result
The result was that the plaintiffs' claim failed. The third
defendants were granted a declaration that they owned copy
right in the relevant drawings. The defendants were entitled
to costs.
Comment
This case highlights two important issues in New Zealand
copyright law. The first is the commissioning rule, which has
recently been reconsidered by the Ministry of Economic
Development. In this case, the parties clearly gave no prior
thought to the issue of copyright ownership, and in the end
copyright remained with the designer/author only because of
the absence of payment on the facts. The opposite result
would have eventuated had there been payment, and the
outcome seems to have been based on little more than
chance.
The second and broader issue the case highlights is the
level of protection available to artistic works in New Zealand
copyright law. In many jurisdictions, copyright protection
would not be available for the design of an asparagus grader.
It is at least arguable that this is the subject-matter for which
patent law was designed. If the asparagus grader, or elements
of its design, were not patented or patentable, and if they
were not the subject of registered design protection, then it is
arguable that copyright protection should not be available
either, and that competition should prevail.
Heinz Watties Ltd v Goodman Fielder Con
sumer Foods P4' Ltd
HC, Auckland CIV 2007-404-6946, 10 December 2008,
Stevens J
This was an oral judgment on a pleading issue in an appeal
from a decision of the Assistant Commissioner of Trade
Marks.
The appellant, Heinz Watties, appealed against the deci
sion of the Assistant Commissioner revoking its PRAISE
trade mark on the grounds of non-use, under s 661a of the
Trade Marks Act 2002. The appeal centres on the interpre
tation of s 66 of the Trade Marks Act 2002.
This particular decision related to an application by the
respondent, Goodman Fielder, to amend or expand the grounds
relied on for revocation. Goodman Fielder had initially relied
solely on s 661a, alleging a continuous period of three
years or more following the date of registration during which
the trade mark was not put to genuine use in the course of
trade in New Zealand. Goodman Fielder sought to amend or
expand the grounds relied upon for revocation to include
s 661b, namely, that "except as provided in subsection 3
the use of the trade mark has been suspended for an
uninterrupted period of three years".
Goodman Fielder relied on s 661a which appeared to
be the appropriate basis for relief, even after all the evidence
had been placed before the Assistant Commissioner. The
issue as to whether s 661b of the Act was available in
addition to s 661a was discussed before the Assistant
Commissioner, but in light of the available evidence counsel
for Goodman Fielder did not consider it appropriate to press
for its addition. However, after the appeal was filed, the
appellant filed further evidence. Goodman Fielder thought
this evidence was potentially relevant to possible relief under
s 661b, and filed a notice of application for leave to
amend or add to the statutciry basis for revocation to include
s 661b of the Act on 25 January 2008. The appellant
opposed the application.
Counsel were agreed that the application fell to be deter
mined under r 11 of the High Court Rules. The Judge said
that an alternative basis for dealing with the application
might be under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court.7 The
Judge said that the starting point for any discussion on the
contents of an application for revocation was reg 95 of the
Trade Marks Regulations 2003, which set out the informa
tion required for an application for revocation. Regula
tion 9 5f required that an application for revocation must
contain "the grounds for revocation". The Judge observed
that it did not in terms state whether the grounds referred to
were the factual grounds or the statutory bases for revoca
tion arising under the Act, and consideration with s 661 of
the Act did not conclusively resolve the point.
The Judge said that at the time of applying for revocation
an applicant was unlikely to know all or perhaps any of the
facts relevant to whether use of the trade mark had been
"suspended for an uninterrupted period of three years". Any
knowledge relating to what occurred within the business of
the owner of the trade mark, or what was in the mind of the
owner of the trade mark when steps which may or may not
amount to suspension were taken, would be unknown, and
could only be known after the respondent had placed its
evidence before the Assistant Commissionen In light of the
lack of clarity in reg 95f, the Judge considered that all that
was required was for the applicant to place the relevant
factual material then known before the Commissioner. There
after, the facts would emerge through the interlocutory and
hearing phases. The appropriate statutory bases for revoca
tion, if available, would only finally be known once all of the
evidence was in and once it had been subject to testing at the
hearing before the Assistant Commissioner. Any failure to
particularise the precise statutory basis for seeking revoca
tion would not mean that the application for revocation was
invalid or ineffective. It would also still qualify as "the
application for revocation" which was the trigger point for
the restriction in s 663 of the Act. There was no good
reason why it should not be open for an applicant who
advanced only one ground in the application to include a
6. Relying on Watson v Dolmark Industries Ltd [1992] 3 NZLR 311.
7. Citing NZ Magic Millions Ltd v Wrightson Bloodstock Ltd [1990] 1 NZLR 731, 743.
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further ground at a later point in the proceeding if evidence
emerged to support it. The date of "the application for
revocation" as a basis for reliance on s 663 would still be
the date of the original application. Even if an applicant were
required to specify both the factual basis and the statutory
grounds relied upon, this ought not to preclude the possi
bility of later amendment by addition once new factual
material emerged to the original application for revocation.
The Judge said that there was power in r 11 to allow the
amendment. In this case, the amendment was simply allowed
in order to permit the respondent to raise as a further basis
that identified in s 661b. This was quite different from
adding a fresh cause of action.8 The Judge considered that it
was in the interests of justice that the amendment be allowed.
The fact that the application to amend was made after the
hearing of the application and during the appeal process was
not determinative. What was important was that when the
High Court came to address the appeal it was in a position to
deal with the real controversy between the parties. It was also
in the interests of justice that the trade mark register be kept
"clean". There was a public interest in ensuring that trade
marks which are not used or have been suspended for the
required period are not allowed to remain on the register.
This public interest in favour of "cleaning" the record and
potentially enhancing competition in the marketplace was
the policy rationale underlying the statutory provision allow
ing applications for revocation.9 Allowing the application
would mean that all aspects of the interpretation of s 661 of
the Act would be able to be thoroughly addressed at the
hearing. All relevant factual questions under s 661a or b
could be considered.
There was no relevant delay. There was also no real
ground of prejudice. The appellant would be able to argue
both the interpretation and any factual matters pertaining to
both s 661a and b. The critical point in the revocation
process was the date upon which the application for revoca
tion was made. Section 663 and 4 dealt with the relevance
and applicability of resumed use. Section 663 provided that
the registration of a trade mark must not be revoked on the
grounds in subs 1a or b if that use was commenced or
resumed after the expiry of the three year period and before
the application for revocation was made. The focus was
upon the facts prior to the application for revocation. Here,
as at the date of application for revocation, the appellant had
not put the PRAISE trade mark to genuine use for a continu
ous period of three years or more following the actual date of
registration. The Assistant Commissioner ordered that the
PRAISE trade mark be removed from the register. Adding to
the available grounds for relief once evidence emerged to
support that ground did not prejudice the appellant.
The Judge held that it should be open to the respondent to
argue on the resumed appeal that, depending on the facts as
found by the High Court, revocation on the basis of s 661b
was available as a possible basis for relief. The application to
refer to s 661b of the Act as a basis for relief was therefore
granted. Costs were reserved.
Westbray Ltd i' Ferrero Sp.A.
HC, Wellington CIV 2007-485-460, 11 December 2008,
Dobson J
This was a successful appeal against a decision of the Assis
tant Commissioner of Trade Marks, in which two grounds of
opposition to a trade mark application were upheld. The
appeal was not opposed.
The appellant, Westbray, applied to register the mark
TICK TOCK in respect of tea in class 30 in July 2005. The
respondent, Ferrero, had had registrations in New Zealand
since 1973 for the trade mark TIC TAC and had marketed its
mint candy products using that trade mark continuously
since 1993. Ferrero opposed Westbray's application, relying
on ss 171a, 251b and 251c of the Trade Marks
Act 2002. The Assistant Commissioner upheld the opposi
tion under s 171a and s 251c but held that the oppo
sition on s 251b was not made out. The finding under
s 171a essentially depended on the Assistant Commis
sioner being satisfied that Ferrero had established a reputa
tion and awareness of its TIC TAC trade mark in New
Zealand so that Westbray's TICK TOCK mark would be
likely to deceive or cause confusion. The finding of the
likelihood of confusion under s 171a led the Assistant
Commissioner to also reach the view that the similarity
would be taken as indicating a connection in the course of
trade between Ferrero's goods and those of the appellant, in
relation to s 251c.
The Judge first considered the approach to the appeal,
referring to Austin, Nichols v Stichting Lodestar'° noting
that the extent of consideration a Court exercising a general
power of appeal gives to the decision appealed from is simply
a matter for the judgment of the Court on appeal. That
meant the basis for and extent of respect afforded to factual
findings or technical attributes of the decision-maker appealed
from was an entirely context-specific assessment for the
Judge on appeal. There was no presumptive level of respect
or deference to the decision-maker.
Section 171a provides that the Commissioner must not
register as a trade mark or part of a trade mark any matter
the use of which would be likely to deceive or cause confu
sion. The Assistant Commissioner found that the use by the
appellant of its TICK TOCK mark for tea would be likely to
deceive or cause confusion within the meaning of s 171a.
The Assistant Commissioner relied on evidence of market
surveys recognising a significant level of brand recall within
New Zealand for TIC TAC. On this ground, Westbray's
appeal was on the basis that the decision failed to have regard
to a number of relevant steps in the reasoning process, before
such a finding under s 171a could be sustained.'1
8. Referring to Chilcott v Goss [1995] 1 NZLR 263 CA, Attorney-General v Carter [2003] 2 NZLR 160 CA and Elders
Pastoral Ltd v Marr 1987 2 PRNZ 383 CA.
9. La Chemise Lacoste v Crocodile Garments Ltd HC, Wellington AP32/02, 18 November 2002, Ronald Young J.
10. Austin, Nichols v Stichting Lodestar [2008] 2 NZLR 141 SC.
11. Pioneer Hi-Bred Corn Company v Hy-Line Chicks Pty Ltd [1978] 2 NZLR 50.
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The Judge said that it was for the Court to determine the
likelihood of deception or confusion, guided by the evidence
of trade circumstances. It was necessary to consider how the
trade marks would be regarded and how they would be
pronounced and heard by those to whom they would be
presented in the course of trade. The impression or idea
conveyed by the marks was important in assessing how they
would be recalled.
The Assistant Commissioner had held that visually the
marks were not identical, but were similar, that aurally there
was significant similarity between the two, and taking into
account the principle of imperfect recollection the similarity
of the marks was enhanced further, and that indeed to all
intents and purposes they became the same. It was also found
that there was "a high degree of conceptual similarity"
between the two marks. Westbray submitted that the two
marks were distinguishable, arguing that its mark comprised
two four letter words whereas Ferrero's comprised two three
letter words, suggesting a measure of difference in appear
ance. It also argued that the second of the words "TOCK"
and "TAG" would be pronounced differently. Further, that
TICK TOCK is an English word which designates the ticking
of a clock, whereas TIC TAC would be seen as a foreign
word, the phonetic equivalent of TIC TAC meaning book
maker's telegraphy by arm signals, or an abbreviation of the
name Tic Tac Toe being a game otherwise known as Noughts
and Crosses. Also, it argued that conceptually the trade
marks were quite different and that that further distin
guished them. It suggested that TICK TOCK conveyed the
passing of time, that it was time for a break in the activities of
a day and therefore "time for tea". In contrast, she suggested
TIC TAG would be seen as a foreign word, perhaps made up
or used because of its somewhat catchy sound.
The Judge said that the differences between the words as
they appear, and aurally as they would sound, were relatively
subtle. If they were to be used for similar goods, then the
Judge doubted that the differences would be sufficient to
avoid the risk of deception or confusion. As to the idea or
concepts behind them, the allusion to passing of time inher
ent in TICK TOCK would be likely to trigger such an
association for a substantial portion of potential buyers of
tea. On the other hand, the Judge did not accept that TIC
TAC would readily trigger the concept of either something
foreign, or a game like Noughts and Crosses, or even less
likely a somewhat arcane description of bookmakers' sign
language. Rather, Ferrero's strong reputation for its small
mints was most likely to convey their product as the imme
diate connotation of the words TIC TAC, which for most
New Zealanders was the only connotation likely to arise
when TIC TAG was mentioned. The Judge said that, cumu
latively, those points of comparison were not decisive against
the prospect of deception or confusion.
The Judge found that the similarities between the trade
marks were both visual and aural. Both contained two short
words, both beginning with "t". "TIC" was common to
both, although in TICK TOCK, there was a silent "k" at the
end. Aurally, the second word would always be pronounced
differently, but there was likely to be a similar rhythm in their
pronunciation, in that there was a degree of alliteration, the
words were easily articulated and lent themselves to being
uttered quickly. These similarities were possibly heightened
by the absence of distinctive or clearly identifiable differences
in the concepts behind the respective marks. It therefore
became important to analyse the wider context in which the
existing marks were, and the proposed mark would be, used.
The Assistant Commissioner found the goods to be dissimi
lar, and the Judge agreed. The goods in respect of which
registration was sought were quite different from those in
respect of which Ferrero's marks were registered, and it was
unlikely that goods bearing the two marks would be posi
tioned alongside or near each other in supermarket outlets or
in dairies or petrol stations.
The Judge found that the Assistant Commissioner's rea
soning had omitted the critical analysis as to whether confu
sion or deception was likely to arise when the appellant
would only use TICK TOCK for tea, being a substantially
different product from the TIC TAG candy mints for which
Ferrero enjoyed such a strong reputation. The products were
of a starkly different type, and would be most unlikely to be
presented to purchasers alongside each other, and indeed the
profile of potential purchasers was also likely to be different.
TIC TACs were prominently displayed near point-of-sale
counters in dairies, service stations and supermarkets, whereas
tea was commonly presented to purchasers in the shelves of
supermarket aisles. TICK TOCK on its own would not be
treated by someone requesting it as a sufficient description,
they would use "TICK TOCK tea". In contrast, TIC TAC
mints, if ever requested, were sufficiently identified by simply
using the trade mark on its own. These relevant distinctions
were sufficient to eliminate the realistic prospects of confu
sion or deception as between the products for which Ferrero
enjoyed such a strong reputation utilising its trade mark TIC
TAC, and the fair and notional use of TICK TOCK as a
brand for tea.
The Judge referred to the 10 propositions on whether a
mark is likely to deceive or cause confusion set out by
Richardson J in Pioneer Hi-Bred and said that that the
Assistant Commissioner's decision showed no recognition of
at least the following two points:
1. In considering the likelihood of deception or confusion
all the surrounding circumstances have to be taken into
consideration, including the circumstances in which
the applicant's mark may be used, the market in which
his goods may be bought and sold and the character of
those involved in that market {..
2. It is in relation to commercial dealings with goods that
the question of deception or confusion has to be con
sidered, and the persons whose states of mind are
material are the prospective or potential purchasers of
goods of the kind to which the applicant may apply his
mark and others involved in the purchase transactions.
The Judge said that Pioneer Hi-Bred placed considerable
weight on the dissimilarity of the goods involved, and was
satisfied that in this case the dissimilarity was decisive against
the prospect of deception or confusion. The same word
would often be registered to different owners for different
products. The Judge said12 consumers were aware that dif
ferent producers are responsible for different goods, notwith
standing the same or substantially similar names. However
12. Referring to Jaguar Cars Ltd v Manufacture Des Montres Jaguar SA [2006] IEHC 103.
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the Judge accepted that the presumption that consumers will
distinguish between the origins of disparate goods marketed
using the same name did not arise as strongly where the name
was not an ordinary English word. Any made-up word was
likely to convey that it was distinctive to one trade mark
owner. Here, "tick-tock" was included in the New Oxford
Dictionary as a noun meaning the sound made by a large
clock. It was likely to he used for a variety of goods and
services, for instance where timeliness is relevant. The breadth
of its possible application meant consumers were likely to be
alive to the different origins of dissimilar goods using this
same name, or a variant on the letters in it.
The Judge allowed the appeal in respect of s 171a,
finding no sufficient likelihood of deception or confusion
under s l71a as to prevent the Commissioner from regis
tering the trade mark.
Section 251c
The Judge said that the Assistant Commissioner, in finding
that registration mark would be contrary to s 251c, did
not consider how the use of TICK TOCK for tea would be
taken to indicate a trade connection between the appellant's
tea and Ferrero, or how the use of TICK TOCK for tea would
be likely to prejudice Ferrero's interests as owner of TIC
TAC. The Judge said that potential consumers would not
always assume a trade connection merely because of the
same or similar names used for disparate goods.13
The Judge found that the dissimilarity of the goods was a
strong indication against there being a trade connection
between TICK TOCK tea and TIC TAC mints. New Zealand
consumers might well have TIC TAC "brought to mind"
when confronted with TICK TOCK tea, but not go on and
assume from the similarity of name that there was a connec
tion between the producers of the dissimilar products. A
connection in the course of trade required more than a
tenuous association such as this extent of similarity in the
names. The dissimilarity of goods also rendered the prospect
of harm less than real and tangible. A loyal buyer of TIC TAC
mints was hardly likely to think less of that product or its
manufacturer because of an adverse experience with TICK
TOCK tea.
The Judge also allowed the appeal on the s 251c
ground, and held that the appellant's application should
proceed to registration.
Maxim Group Ltd v Jones Publishing Ltd & Ors
HC, Auckland CIV 2008-404-008 179, 16 December 2008,
Randerson J
The plaintiff Maxim operated a business specialising in
creative design work and associated activities. For five years
to November 2008, Maxim had provided design and other
services to the First, Second and Third Defendants the Jones
Group. The Fourth and Fifth Defendants substantially owned
the Jones Group, which published a number of magazines
prepared for specific clients.
Maxim had carried out creative work for the Jones Group
for a number of years. In this case, it claimed that it had
undertaken work for it was owed payment, and that the debt
was accumulated over the period May to October 2008.
There was evidence that from early August 2008 Maxim
was aware that the Jones Group had financial difficulties. In
or about October 2008, the Jones Group entered into an
agreement with a company under which it granted a licence
to produce some of its magazines. When Maxim became
aware of this it sought interim injunctive relief against the
Jones Group which included restraining the companies in the
group from using, publishing, selling or distributing identi
fied magazines containing the work which Maxim said it had
created. Then on 5 December 2008 the Jones Group went
into voluntary administration under Part iSA Companies
Act 1993, and a meeting at which creditors would consider
the future of the Jones Group, was to take place on 18 Decem
ber 2008, after the decision in this case. Maxim amended its
application to seek an order that Jones Publishing Ltd, Top
Gear NZ Ltd and Dish Publishing Ltd cease use, publication,
sale, or distribution to third parties entities of all creative
work identified in schedule one to the statement of claim,
except for Dish Magazine. It also sought an order that Jones
Publishing Ltd, and Dish Publishing Ltd establish an interest
bearing solicitors trust account, for payment of all monies
received from the assignment, grant of licence, use or sale of
existing and future editions of Dish Magazine. The monies,
including interest, were to be retained in the solicitors' trust
account pending trial of these proceedings.
Part iSA of the Companies Act required that during the
administration of a company, a proceeding against the com
pany or in relation to any of its property could not begin or
continue except with the administrator's written consent or
with the permission of the Court. The administrators of the
company had not and under s 239ABE the Judge had to
decide whether permission to continue the proceeding should
be given and, if so, whether Maxim should be granted
interim relief.
The Judge first considered the merits of Maxim's applica
tion for interim relief since the strength or otherwise of
Maxim's case was material in deciding whether permission to
continue the proceeding should be granted. Maxim's claim
against the Jones Group was in breach of contract. There was
no copyright cause of action, although Maxim's claim to
intellectual property in its "creative work" relied on its
ownership of copyright in that work.
Maxim claimed that its contractual relationship with the
Jones Group was governed by its terms of trade which it said
were known to and accepted by the Jones Group. Maxim
claimed that the terms of trade meant that the intellectual
property rights arising from the work it carried out for the
Jones Group remained its property and could not be utilised
or acted upon by the Jones Group until the work was paid for
in full. Once payment was made, the Jones Group had a
licence to use the design work for the specific project for
which it was intended but not for other projects without
Maxim's consent. In relation to the commissioning rule in
s 213 of the Copyright Act 1994, Maxim said that the
consequences as to ownership which would otherwise arise
13. Referring to Jaguar Cars Ltd v Manufacture Des MontresJaguar SA [2006] IEHC 103 and Intel Corporation Inc v CPM
United Kingdom Ltd [2007] R.P.C. 35.
558 New Zealand Intellectual Property Journal May 2009
IP ROUND-UP
under s 213 were overridden by the terms of trade, which
constituted an "agreement to the contrary" in terms of
s 214 of the Copyright Act.
The Judge found two factual difficulties with Maxim's
claim. First, the Jones Group denied it was ever bound by, or
even aware of, Maxim's terms of trade. Second was the
difficulty of identifying exactly what parts of the various
publications were claimed to be Maxim's creative work.
Maxim identified a number of elements of specific magazines
published by the Jones Group which it claimed were its
creative work, including the logo/masthead for the publica
tions identified, the design grid, typography, layout and in
some cases photographs, diagram style and graphic ele
ments. The Judge said that apart from the references to the
logolrnasthead, there was no specificity or identification in
the evidence of any particular photographs, layout, diagrams
or graphic elements which are alleged to have been created by
Maxim, and no identification as to when any particular
elements were created or provided by Maxim to the Jones
Group. It was not possible to identify which elements of
Maxim's claimed creative work had been paid for and would
therefore, on Maxim's case, be available for use by the Jones
Group.
The Judge said that since the trading relationship between
Maxim and the Jones Group had existed for some five years,
it was reasonable to infer that substantial elements of the
work undertaken by Maxim had been paid for in earlier
years. The Judge also said that it was reasonably clear on the
evidence that reliance by Maxim on the written terms of
trade was not sustainable. If they were known by the Jones
Group despite its denial then there was a strong case for
concluding they were either varied or waived by the conduct
of the parties.
The Judge set out the legal elements of a copyright claim,
saying that Maxim must first establish that it owned copy
right in an original work of the kind described in s 14 of the
Copyright Act. The Judge found a lack of specificity of
evidence as to whether Maxim's claimed work would qualify
as an "artistic work" or "literary work" or "compilation".
The Jones Group argued that copyright in the typographical
arrangements of the published editions of the subject maga
zines belonged to the Jones Group as publisher, citing s S2e
of the Copyright Act 1994. The Judge said that since a
substantial part of Maxim's claim to ownership of its creative
work was in respect of the typography, design and layout of
the subject magazines, its claim to copyright in that respect
was most unlikely to succeed, as prima facie, ownership of
the copyright in the typographical arrangements of these
publications belonged to the Jones Group.
The Judge said that there could be copyright subsisting in
elements independently from the typographical arrange
ments, referring to elements such as photographs, specific
graphics or drawings provided by Maxim. However, there
remained an ownership question arising from the commis
sioning rule ins 213 of the Copyright Act. This meant that,
to the extent that the Jones Group requested Maxim to
provide works falling within s 213a for which the Jones
Group had paid or agreed to pay, then the Jones Group as the
commissioning party was the first owner of any copyright in
the work unless, in terms of s 214, there was an agreement
to the contrary. The Judge said that there was no dispute that
the Jones Group requested and agreed to pay for all the work
Maxim carried out, and that, given the sharply contrasting
evidence as to the terms of trade alleged, the absence of any
documentary evidence to show that the Jones Group were
aware of the terms of trade as Maxim alleged, and the actual
pattern of trading between the parties, the prospects of
Maxim being able to establish a contrary agreement under
s 214 were weak.
The Judge also said that, even if Maxim established that it
owned copyright in some elements, to the extent that the
magazines had already been published, Maxim had authorised
their publication in terms of s 161i of the Copyright Act,
and there was therefore no infringement. No material had
been placed before the court to demonstrate the prospect of
an infringement of copyright in future publications, and
there was no material to enable assessment of the extent of
any losses which might be sustained by Maxim if it could
establish an infringement of copyright. Maxim's prospects of
establishing liability at trial were therefore very weak.
The Judge went on to consider balance of convenience
and overall justice, but said that because the Jones Group
was in voluntary administration, those issues were domi
nated by the potential effect on the creditors if interim relief
were granted. After reviewing the applicable statute and
authorities, the Judge said that he was not persuaded it
would be right to grant permission for Maxim to continue
this proceeding even if that were limited to seeking interim
relief. The Judge dismissed the application for an interim
injunction, and the application under s 239ABE of the Com
panies Act 1993 for permission to continue the proceeding.
The first, second and third defendants were entitled to costs
on a 2B basis,
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